Some problems in uncertainty modelling and foundational issues (in relation with IS1304 EJNET)

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Some caveats

- My biases (but I tried to open my mind)
- My limits (but I have read a lot)
- Focusing on modeling and foundational issues
- Many, inevitably, at the interface with several other WGs
- Not all at same detail level (again my bias)
- Indeed, most of them rather informal questions

ECUATE_j

- 1. Eliciting EJ
- 2. Combining EJ
- 3. Using EJ
- 4. Assessing EJ
- 5. Technology and EJ

6. A testbed project

1. Elicitation for main distributions

- O'Hagan et al (2006) compare 10+ methods for eliciting the parameters of a Beta(a,b) distribution (conjugate of binomial) trying to come out with a best method
- Similar studies for other conjugate distributions so as to get a best practice catalogue
 - Observables (predictive)
 - Quantiles
 - Probabilistic Inversion method
- NB: Multivariate distributions. WG2

1. Preference modelling

- Farquhar (1984)
- Draw new light on such methods?
- Distribution of preference over stakeholders.
 Ranges of reactions/Sensitivity analysis
- Weighted additive utility... Multiplicative utility
- Error models for utilities

1. Deep uncertainties, long term uncertainties

- Meaningless?
- Worse performance at deep, long term tasks
- Decision under risk vs Decision under uncertainty..... Knight etc...
- Strategy in Stewart, French, Rios (not me!!!)

1. Adversarial uncertainty modelling

• RA enhanced to include adversaries ready to increase our risks

- S-11, M-11 lead to large security investments globally
- Many modelling efforts to efficiently allocate such resources
- Parnell et al (2008) NAS review
 - Standard reliability/risk approaches not take into acocunt intentionality
 - Game theoretic approaches. Common knowledge assumption...
 - Decision analytic approaches. Forecasting the adversary action...
- Merrick, Parnell (2011) review approaches commenting favourably on Adversarial Risk Analysis



Non strategic opponent. I

• A lacks memory. Dirichlet-multinomial model

 $(p_1, \dots, p_n) \sim \mathcal{D}(\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n)$ $(p_1, \dots, p_n) | \text{data} \sim \mathcal{D}(\alpha_1 + h_1, \dots, \alpha_n + h_n)$ $p_D^{NS}(a_i) = E(p_i | \text{data}) = \frac{\alpha_i + h_i}{\sum_{j=1}^n (\alpha_j + h_j)}, i = 1, \dots, n,$

$$\max_{d} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \psi_D(d, a_i) p_D^{NS}(a_i)$$

Non strategic opponent. II

• A remembers his last attack, her last defense and the results. Matrix-beta prior model

 $(p_1, \ldots, p_n)|a_i, d_j, \omega \sim \mathcal{D}(\alpha_1^{ij\omega}, \ldots, \alpha_n^{ij\omega})$

 $(p_1,\ldots,p_n)|a_i,d_j,\omega,\text{data}\sim \mathcal{D}(\alpha_1^{ij\omega}+n_1^{ij\omega},\ldots,\alpha_n^{ij\omega}+n_n^{ij\omega})$

• To control size growth, mixture model

 $p_D(a|a_i, d_j, \omega) = w_1 p_D(a|a_i) + w_2 p_D(a|d_j) + w_3 p_D(a|\omega).$

Inference and forecast through a Gibbs sampler Ficticious play

Level-k thinking opponent I

• D needs to solve

$$d^* = \arg \max_d \left[\sum_a \psi_D(d, a) p_D(a) \right]$$

• For this, she thinks about A's problem

$$a^{*} = \arg \max_{a} \left[\sum_{d} \psi_{D}(d, a) p_{A}(d) \right]$$
$$= \arg \max_{a} \left[\sum_{d} \int u_{A}(d, a, \omega) p_{A}(\omega | a, d) d\omega \right] p_{A}(d)$$

- She does not know $(u_A, p_A(.|.), p_A)$
- Models uncertainty through (U_A, P_A(.|.), P_A)

$$A|D \sim \arg\max_{a} \sum_{d} \left[\int U_A(d, a, \omega) P_A(\omega|a, d) d\omega \right] P_A(d) \qquad p_D(a) = p_{A|D}(a)$$

Simulate

Level-k thinking opponent II

 $(U_A, P_A(\cdot | \cdot), P_A)$

$$D|A^1 \sim \arg \max_d \sum_a \left[\int U_D(d, a, \omega) P_D(\omega|a, d) d\omega \right] P_D(a),$$

Repeat from i = 1

Find $P_{D^{i-1}}(A^i)$ by solving

$$\begin{array}{lcl} A^i \mid D^i & \sim & \operatorname*{arg\,max}_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \sum_{d \in \mathcal{D}} \left[\int U^i_A(a,d,\omega) P^i_A(\omega \mid a,d) d\omega \right] P^i_A(D^i=d) \\ & & \text{with } (U^i_A,P^i_A(\cdot \mid \cdot),P^i_A) \sim F^i \end{array}$$

Find $P_A^i(D^i)$ by solving

$$\begin{array}{lll} D^i \mid A^{i+1} & \sim & \arg\max_{d \in \mathcal{D}} \ \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \left[\int U_D^i(a,d,\omega) P_D^i(\omega \mid a,d) d\omega \right] P_D^i(A^{i+1}=a) \\ & \text{ with } (U_D^i,P_D^i(\cdot \mid \cdots),P_D^i) \sim G^i \end{array}$$

i = i + 1

MacLay, Rothschild, Guikema (2012) Rios, DRI (2012)

Prospect opponent

- EU model OK for D (as giving prescriptive advice)
- EU model OK for A???
- Terrorist psychology and logistics suggest optimising terrorists (cutthroat capitalism)

$$\arg\max_{a} \left[\sum_{d} \int v_{A}(d, a, \omega) w_{A}^{1}(p_{A}(\omega|a, d)) d\omega \right] w_{A}^{2}(p_{A}(d))$$
$$A|D = \arg\max_{a} \left[\sum_{d} \int V_{A}(d, a, \omega) W_{A}^{1} P_{A}(\omega|a, d)) d\omega \right] W_{A}^{2}(P_{A}(d)).$$

Reconciling and learning about opponent model

• Use a mixture of opponent models

$$p_D(a) = \sum_{i=1}^k q_i p_D^i(a)$$

• Model averaging to optimize

$$\max_{d} \sum_{a} \psi_D(d, a) \left(\sum_{i=1}^k q_i p_D^i(a) \right) = \max_{d} \sum_{i=1}^k q_i \left[\sum_{a} \psi_D(d, a) p_D^i(a) \right]$$

• Model selection to learn about weights.

1. Adversarial uncertainty modeling

- Additional operational principles
- More complex structures
- Is it worth going up one level in the hierarchy
 ^{More} accurate, but more work
 - ^{Value} of information gained
- Multiple experts stopping at different levels
- ..

1. Multivariate extreme models

- Many extreme problems are multivariate
 - E.g. in extreme weather, floods+droughts (possibly because of El Niño-La Niña effects)
- Univariate extreme models relatively well understood
 - Choice of thresholds?
 - Mixture models
- Need to model dependence

2. Aggregating rules

- New aggregating rules still appearing
 - Hora et al (2013) Median aggregation
 - Lichtendahl et al (2013) Averaging quantiles
 - Jose et al (2013) Trimmed av quantiles
- A comparison with gold standards required
- Modelling as a mixture problem (prior on weights to model dependence)

3. Risk Matrix methods

OCCURRENCE CATEGORY / EVENT TYPE					
RISK MATRIX	Without Safety Effect	Significant Incident	Major Incident	Serious Incident	Accident
Extremely Unlikely					
Extremely Remote					
Remote					
Reasonably Possible					
Frequent					

ARMS, Bowtie, IRP,...

3. Risk Matrix Methods

- ICAO, for civil aviation
- COSO, for auditing
- MAGERIT, HMG Std 1, for IT Security
- IPCC SREX, for extreme weather risks

3. Risk Matrix Methods

- From Cox (2008)
 - Ambiguous inputs and outputs
 - Insufficient detail
 - Suboptimal resource allocation
 - Errors

3. Risk matrix methods

- If, leaving apart laziness, we lack of resources to perform a proper risk analysis...
- How much do we lose for not doing the whole thing?
- As in ordinal data, latent variables with thresholds for likelihoods. Similarly for impacts/utilities.
- Combining expert judgements in such setting

3. Back to discretisation...

 $P(A|\hat{\theta})$ $P(A|data) = \int P(A|\theta)\pi(\theta|data)d\theta$ $P_{MC}(A|data) = \frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^{n} P(A|\theta_i)$ $\tilde{P}(A) = \sum_{i=1}^{m} P(A|\theta_i)p_i$

Reduced order models (Grigoriu, 2009) Also usable in reporting (as in risk matrices)

4. Scoring rules

- Scoring rules for elicitation (Savage)
- New scoring rules appearing (eg Merkle, Steyvers, 2013)
- Compare with gold standards
- Role in elicitation
- How are they modified with extreme incentives and disincentives?

4. Sensitivity Analysis

Parameters -----→ Inf, Pred, Risk Ass, DM
Baucells, Borgonuovo (2013), DRI, Ruggeri (2000)

• EJ-- \rightarrow Parameters -- \rightarrow Inf, Pred, Risk Ass, DM

5. EJ Technology

 Many of the above ideas, and others already around, and others coming from IS1304 WGs could be turn into software supporting EJ services

- EJ Web Services
- Links to R, Winbugs etc...
- Open Source

5. The limits of expert judgement?

• EJ in times of Big Data?

• BD: The end of science as we know it....

• How do we combine EJ with Big Data

Runway excursions



Runway excursions





 $E_j = p_{0j}I_0 + p_{1j}E_j^+,$ $p_{0j} + p_{1j} = 1,$ $p_{0j}, p_{1j} \ge 0,$

$$p(e|a_j, d = 0, data) = \frac{1 + n_j - y_j}{2 + n_j}I_0 + \frac{1 + y_j}{2 + n_j}\frac{\alpha_j\beta_j^{\alpha_j}}{(\beta_j + e)^{\alpha_j+1}}$$

$$p(e|a, d = 1, data) = \frac{\tilde{\alpha}_j (\tilde{\beta}_j)^{\tilde{\alpha}_j}}{(\tilde{\beta}_j + e)^{\tilde{\alpha}_j + 1}},$$





(a) Runway 01 end



(c) Runway 03 end

6. A testbed project

SAFETY

Safety is Critical in Civil Aviation



STATE SAFETY PROGRAMME?

- ICAO : "An integrated set of regulations and activities established by a State aimed at managing civil aviation safety"
- Support strategic decision-making in adopting better decisions when allocating scare resources to higher safety risk areas
- To implement preventive approach for safety oversight and to manage safety at a State level, States must develop a State Safety Program (SSP)



State Safety Program



PROJECT METHODOLOGY

- Incident forecasting
- Incident consequence assessment and forecasting
- Risk mapping
- Deciding on interventions (resource allocation)
- Detailed analysis of chosen incidents

- Pervaded by risk matrices
- From reactive to predictive
- Expert Judgement, multiple experts (with different interests), multiattribute preference modelling, extreme event modelling, dependence, use for policy making,....

Thanks

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