



USING EXPERT JUDGEMENT FOR EVALUATION IN MILITARY MISSIONS

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WHO AM I?

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- › TNO Consultant (since 2004)
- › Reserve Officer (Maj)
Operational Analyst (since 2006)

- › Deployed: Task Force Uruzgan
1 Dec 2007 – Apr 2008
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AFGHANISTAN

Uzbekistan

Tadjikistan

Turkmenistan

Iran


Pakistan



AFGHAN PEOPLE



TFU STAFF





ROLE OF OPERATIONAL ANALYSTS



› Operational Analysts

Support and advise the commander of a unit and his staff in planning and executing a mission, by applying scientific methods and tools.

In sum, analysis on:


Are we executing the tasks right?

→ *Measurement of Performance*

Are we executing the right tasks?

→ *Measurement of Effectiveness*

MEASURING MISSION PROGRESS



MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

HOW TO MEASURE CHANGE?

1. Develop a set of indicators that can describe the effect

2. Measure periodically

Analysis of information on indicators:

- › What happened? Which trends can we deduce?

Analysis of own effort

- › What activities did we execute? What was the outcome? According to plan?

3. Interpretation of results and advice

- › What changes can be distinguished? Was this change expected? What did we expect to happen?

EXPERT JUDGMENT

1. Develop a set of indicators that can describe the effect
 - › Consult experts:
 - › “What are important element of the effect?”
 - › E.g. local healthcare system consists of doctors, midwives, ect
 - › “What should we be able to observe once the effect is achieved?”
 - › E.g. amount of window glass sold as indicator for perception of security
2. Measure periodically
 - › Consult experts:
 - › “What is your current opinion on the effectiveness of the chief of police?”
3. Interpretation of results and advice
 - › Consult experts:
 - › “How can the trend be explained?”
 - › “What can be done to influence it?”

EXAMPLE

- › Factor: Recruitment and selection
- › Objective: “The Afghan government is capable of filling its AUP tashkill through ethnic and tribally balanced recruitment whereby the women receive sufficient opportunities. The quantity and quality of recruits meets the fundamental criteria like no drug abuse, motivation and sufficient amount of women.”
- › Main topics:
 1. Insight in the background of the recruits concerning potential threats to the force and threats to the mission
 2. Filling AUP tashkill through ethnically and tribally balanced recruitment whereby the women receive sufficient opportunities
 3. The quantity and quality of recruits meets the fundamental criteria like no drug abuse motivation and sufficient amount of women

Main topic 1: Insight in the background of the recruits concerning potential threats to the force and threats to the mission

Indicator 1: Origin of recruits

Indicator 2: Tribal, social or ethnic tensions

Main topic 2: Filling AUP tashkill through ethnic and tribally balanced recruitment whereby the women receive sufficient opportunities

Indicator 1: Ethnic division

Indicator 2: Tribal division

Indicator 3: Gender division

Main topic 3: The quantity and quality of recruits meets the fundamental criteria like no drug abuse, motivation and sufficient amount of women

Indicator 1: Drug abuse of recruits

Indicator 2: Motivation of recruits

Indicator 3: Amount of female recruits

LESSONS


- › I highly depended on experts to collect information, which was sometimes biased;
- › Combine several techniques (e.g. facts, expert opinions, ...) to gain the best insight
- › Use of workshop techniques to elicit and interpret information
- › It takes time to measure change, so it is important to document the line of reasoning to be able to interpret past measurements

**THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION
QUESTIONS?**



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VISUALISATION



assessment
visualization
instrument

JAN 2011 JUL 2011 JAN 2012 JUL 2012 JAN 2013 JUL 2013

Camerongo-Ouest

- Salonga
- Katavi
- Goma
- Zemongo

Camerongo mission progress
Salonga
JUL 2013

Progress history
compared to previous measurement

JAN 2011 JUL 2011 JAN 2012 JUL 2012 JAN 2013 JUL 2013

IOI IOI IOI IOI IOI IOI

Illegal logging

AMBITION

long term Decrease of illegal logging activities.

mid term The amount of illegal logging activities in the southern part of SALONGA is reduced to a minimum. Lumbers lost their influence on the local population and the local population...[click for more](#)

short term

- Support of lumbers by the local population is reduced;
- Logging network including lumbers is indicated in the northern part of SALONGA;
- Alternative livelihood programs started in the north;

LINE OF REASONING

The influence of illegal logging is decreased. The amount of acres deforested is stabilized, and slightly decreased in the southern part of SALONGA. In the southern part, illegal logging activities no longer dominate daily life of the population. Local farmers are no longer forced to work for the lumbers and have returned to their crops and cattle, resulting in a growing amount of flourishing local markets...[click for more](#)

ADVICE

- Improve the credibility of the local government and the local police in the northern part.
- Exploit the success of the alternative livelihood programs in the southern part to the northern part.
- Gain insight in the illegal logging network as a whole.

Facts

8th of April, Denis Adama is captured during a combined operation.

This spring the amount of deforestation is stabilized compared to last year (source WWF).

Observations

Local chiefs in the southern part indicate illegal activities to CAM patrols, this information provides insight in the illegal network.

TreesCat, a local NGO focused on agriculture reported that more farmers are actually working on the fields. Last year a lot of fields were left unattended because the farmers were forced to work for illegal logging companies.

Interview results

On March 17th of this year the President of Camerongo, resigned his post. Eric Philpah (BBC) interviewed him, looking back at his years as the President of Camerongo. The unrest and confusion such a coup brought disaster on many of Camerongo's biological treasures. Within days armed gangs, allegedly funded by Chinese traders, entered two of Camerongos world-renowned national

Polling data

Own effort

(click map to enlarge)

View Edit Compare Analyze Log About framework

add to presentation add to report

EXAMPLE

› EFFECTS TO ACHIEVE

- › Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance (HA) unhindered
- › Illegal cross-border activities prevented
- › Quality of performance of local armed forces improved

› EFFECTS TO AVOID

- › Collateral damage
- › Land bases for pirates established

EFFECT: DELIVERY OF HA UNHINDERED

› Indicators

- › HA situation
- › HA infrastructure
- › Convoy coordination of HA
- › Security influencing HA
- › Perception and support

› HA situation

- › Provision of HA aid
- › # of refugees
- › Influx of refugees
- › # refugee camps
- › % filled, capacity camps



› HA infrastructure

- › # convoys
- › # road closings
- › # chokepoints
- › Gov. road repair capability
- › extent of theft of HA goods from logistical hubs

HA SITUATION

METRICS & CONCLUSION

Last 3 months



Provision of HA aid

- Delivered
- Needed

Less stock

of IDPs and DPRES

- Our AOR: increasing
- PET: prob. decreasing

Increasing

Influx of refugees

- From Low -> Moderate

Increasing

% filled, capacity camps

- Our AOR: 70% -> 82%
- PET: UNK


Increasing

Conclusion:

- The amount HA still sufficient
- Refugee camps increasingly filled: less spare capacity
- Amount of aid needed is growing quicker than amount of aid delivered

HA INFRASTRUCTURE METRICS & CONCLUSION

Convoys



convoys

UN, IOs/NGOs, NIMFOR


Increasing

road closings

- Bad road conditions
- Accidents

Increasing

road closings



accidents at chokepoints

Increasing


Increasing

GoT road repair capability

Low

No change

of accidents



Conclusion:

- Number of road closings has increased, partly due to accidents near some chokepoints
- Travel time has increased
- GoT capacity to repair roads must be increased
- Improving chokepoints can decrease the number of accidents

- › **Level of cooperation between GoT & HA org.**
 - › - low
- › **Capability of GoT to coordinate traffic/ convoys**
 - › - low
- › **Capability of GoT to coordinate delivery of HA**
 - › - low

No change

No change

No change


- Convoys in TYT must be coordinated so that routes are not clogged by large numbers of trucks. In order to coordinate HA convoys, various mechanisms are in place, at local, provincial and national levels.
- Due to developments (tensions) within the GoT, cooperation between national and provincial levels is deteriorating.
- GoT officials at present lack capability and training to coordinate the delivery of HA.

Conclusion:

- HA convoy coordination is insufficient.
- This is becoming a severe problem due to the increasing amount of HA that needs to be delivered in increasing numbers of convoys.

SECURITY

METRICS & CONCLUSIONS



› % convoys cancelled due to security reasons

Increasing

› 5% -> 5% ->10 %


› # corruption incidents involving TYT officials

Increasing

› # security incidents

Increasing

- Robbery/ theft
- Attack/ IED
- Corruption



Conclusion:

- The number of attacks at HA convoys has been increasing due to JTM incursions. This caused a growing number of convoys to be cancelled due to security reasons.
- Aside from robbery, theft of HA goods in the Osman harbor area has also been increasing, and this coincides with an increase in reports of corruption among police in Osman.

▶ **Popular support for the GoT, NIMFOR, and IOs/ NGOs** has been decreasing in NE TYT. This can be attributed to the worsening security situation, widespread corruption among officials of GoT, and mounting difficulties in delivery of HA by IOs and NGOs.


Decreasing

▶ Furthermore, the **perception of security** by IOs and NGOs which had until recently been stable, is now deteriorating. This is due not only to real security issues, but also a gradual erosion of trust in the GoT, caused by its corruption and inability to coordinate HA. TNP tells OCC when lucrative conveyors are

Decreasing

Conclusion:

- Popular support is decreasing.
- The decreasing perception of security by HA organisations is affecting the flow of HA.



- Protection of LLOC
- IO activities
- Supporting coordination
- Supporting TSF
- Security issues in OSMAN
- Specific OPS such as: frago 002

NO INFORMATION

- › This assessment period we saw no improvement in the unhindered delivery of HA. However, there is an increasing pressure on the HA delivery chain. If not remedied, this will result in a decrease in the delivery of HA. Although at present sufficient HA is available, if current trends persist, the situation will become problematic.
- › Road conditions are adequate at this moment. The maximum carrying capacity has not been reached, so in theory more convoys and more trucks are possible. However, delays and accidents are rising. A large proportion of the delays are caused by accidents at certain chokepoints. Furthermore, an increasing number of convoys are cancelled, and security incidents are also rising. If these trends continue, road congestion, delays and cancellations will influence the delivery of HA.

- › Convoy coordination mechanisms are not working properly, at national as well as provincial level. Coordination in Osman suffers from lack of human capital, infrastructure and corruption. Together with the increasing traffic and thus increasing need for coordination this will create problems in the (near) future.
- › The deterioration of the security situation is caused mainly by JTM raids on HA convoys. The cooperation between TNP (especially in Osman) and JTM and other OCG is an important contributing factor to the success of the raids. IOs and NGOs, aware of these dynamics, are losing trust and hesitant to send convoys. Taken together, the security situation and the perception of the situation is affecting the flow of HA.

RECOMMENDATIO

Opportunities

› **Infrastructural improvements**

- › Improve infrastructure at chokepoints. Invest in infrastructural projects (QIPs) IOT improve travel time. Request USAID to finance improvements
- › Expansion of MSR network by using other MSRs (from ASSAB) by JLSG. And improve presence in Assab, incl. harbor

› **Improve convoy coordination**

- › Support and liaise with Regional Coordination Centre, that coordinates all convoys IOT improve interagency coordination

› **Challenges**

- › **Shifting focus** to operations outside our AOR reduces our presence. This can offer JTM/ Yunni/ TO an opportunity to increase their influence, which we have to mitigate
- › Cooperation between **corrupt TNP** and OCG (esp. JTM) threatens delivery of HA